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I. Introduction 
 
In recent months, a number of scholars and commentators have 
articulated versions of the following argument: 
 
(1) U.S. tax law favors capital over labor;1 
(2) Robots are capital; 2 
(3) Therefore, U.S. tax law favors robots over labor.3 
 
Three implications tend to be drawn from this syllogism: (a) that U.S. 
tax law leads to inefficient investments in automation;4 (b) that 
 
 
 
 
1 See, e.g., Daren Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, Automation and New Tasks: How 
Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor, 33 J. Econ. Persp. 3, 25 (2019) (“The US tax 
code aggressively subsidizes the use of equipment (for example, via various tax credits and 
accelerated amortization) and taxes the employment of labor (for example, via payroll 
taxes).”); Orly Mazur, Taxing the Robots, 46 Pepp. L. Rev,. 277, 281 (2019) (“[T]he tax law 
currently undertaxes capital income and overtaxes labor income.”); Jay A. Soled & Kathleen 
DeLaney Thomas, Automation and the Income Tax, 10 Colum. J. Tax LawL. 1, 7 (2018) 
(“Investments in capital are generally taxed more favorably than labor income.”). 
2 Ryan Abott & Brian Bogenschneider, Should Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of 
Automation, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 145, 151 (2018) (“As a matter of taxation, automated 
workers represent a type of capital investment, and capital income is currently taxed at much 
lower rates than labor income.”); Mazur, supra note 1, at 299 (“A tax on robots is essentially a 
tax on the capital employed by the business that utilizes the robot.”); Soled & Thomas, supra 
note 1, at 3 (characterizing “robotics” as a form of capital). 
3 See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 2, at 150 (“The current system encourages 
automation by providing employers with preferential tax treatment for robot workers.”); 
Mazur, supra note 1, at 317 (“Tax incentives to purchase capital assets are likely to result in an 
overinvestment in automation.”); Robert Green, How To Fix the Tax Code So It Doesn’t Favor 
Robots Over Humans, FORBES (May 30, 2017, 7:20 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/05/30/how-to-fix-tax-reform-so-it-
doesnt-favor-robots-over-humans [https://perma.cc/PA7Y-VFUY]. 
4 See Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 1, at 25-26 (suggesting that tax preferences for capital 
lead to “potentially excessive” automation, and adding that automation may be “induced by 
tax distortions”); Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and 
Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 303 n.191 (2018) (“[T]o the degree that law effectively 
taxes the employment of human labor . . . , it distorts firms’ demand for labor versus capital in 
the form of labor-saving technology.”(citing Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 2)); 
Mazur, supra note 1, at 281 (“By granting tax preferences to capital income, the tax system . . 
. encourages the non-optimal use of robots, which creates undesirable economic inefficiencies 
and deadweight losses.”); Eduardo Porter, Don’t Fight the Robots. Tax Them, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/23/sunday-review/tax-artificial-
intelligence.html (“[E]liminating the tax break for robots would . . . improve economic 
efficiency. By subsidizing capital investment, the government is encouraging businesses to use 
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automation—because it is capital-intensive and capital is tax-
favored—will result in a reduction in tax revenues;5 and (c) that 
policymakers should respond to the automation trend either by 
imposing explicit taxes on robots or by raising taxes on all capital.6 
 
This short essay seeks to illustrate why the line of argument above is 
misguided. First, the claim that U.S. tax law is biased toward capital 
rests entirely on an unstated (and uncertain) normative premise: that 
the United States should tax income rather than consumption. If an 
income tax is the baseline, then U.S. tax law exhibits a pro-capital 
bias; if a consumption tax is the baseline, then U.S. tax law exhibits an 
anti-capital bias. Which baseline we choose depends on normative 
choices that claims of capital-favoritism tend to occlude. Second, 
robots do not only (or even primarily) represent “capital”; they also 
embed the labor of engineers and others. The labor of robot makers is 
often taxed at unfavorable rates relative to the labor of the workers 
whom automation threatens to displace. Third, the idea that U.S. tax 
law incentivizes firms to replace human workers with robots’ rests on 
doubtful logic, and the claim that automation will erode the tax base 
finds little support either.  
 
This essay is not an argument against capital income taxation or a 
 
capital when they otherwise would not, to replace workers with machines.”) 
[https://perma.cc/6VVC-VJA6]. 
5 Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 2, at 150 (“Automation significantly reduces the 
government’s tax revenue since most tax revenue comes from labor-related taxes. When firms 
replace employees with machines, the government loses income due to taxation. . . . [W]orker 
automation could result in hundreds of billions or even trillions of dollars in tax revenue lost 
per year at various levels of government.”); Mazur, supra note 1, 290-295 (predicting “loss of 
tax revenue” due to automation); Soled & Thomas, supra note 1, at 32-35 (projecting decline 
in tax revenue due to automation); Porter, supra note 4 (stating that “the rise of robots shrinks 
government tax revenue”); see also Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Karie Davis-Nozemack, 
Humans vs. Robots: Rethinking Policy for a More Sustainable Future, 79 MARYLAND L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 51), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3373298 (“Increased worker 
displacement caused by automation substitution could result in society’s inability to meet the 
benefit demands of Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment [insurance] . . . .”). 
6 See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 2, at 169-73 (suggesting five options for tax 
reform: disallow corporate income tax deductions for investments in automation; impose a 
federal “automation tax”; allow accelerated deductions for future wage expenses; extend the 
federal self-employment tax to corporations; and increase the corporate tax rate); Mazur, 
supra note 1, at 305-13 (suggesting reforms to expand the payroll tax base and increase taxes 
on capital income in order to “address[] the robot threat”). 
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defense of the current Code, which does tax capital income but not all 
that much. I believe, though, that the case for capital income taxation 
will be stronger if it is based on firm foundations rather than on 
dubious claims of robot favoritism. The essay also is not a full 
treatment of the arguments for and against taxing capital. Its objective 
is to evaluate one such argument and to show why it is unpersuasive. 
 
Part II of the essay examines the claim that the U.S. tax system favors 
capital over labor. Part III turns to the question of whether robots 
represent capital or embedded labor. Part IV considers the case for 
explicit taxation of robots or broader taxation of capital once illusions 
about the tax code’s pro-robot bias are cleared away.  
 
II. Taxing Capital and Labor 
 
a. Baseline Games 
 
Claims about favoritism and bias in tax law depend critically on the 
choice of baseline. If the baseline is a tax on Haig-Simons income (i.e., 
consumption plus change in net worth), then a tax system that applies 
a lower effective rate to capital income than labor income will have a 
pro-capital bias. If the baseline is a tax on cash flow, then a tax system 
that applies a positive effective rate to capital income will have an 
anti-capital bias. Neither observation is especially helpful if our goal is 
to decide whether (and how much) to tax capital income. 
 
This is not a novel point,7 which is one reason why it is surprising to 
see the claim that U.S. tax law favors labor over capital persist in the 
scholarly literature. For those unfamiliar with the point, a series of 
quick examples will serve to illustrate. 
 
Example 1: Imagine a two-period world and two taxpayers, 
 
 
 
 
7 Larry Zelenak made exactly this point in a different context more than two decades ago when 
criticizing the claim that the U.S. tax system favors whites over African-Americans. Lawrence 
Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1521, 1565 (1998) (“Given 
the different views of the ideal tax system, it is not enough simply to assume an income tax 
ideal and label as suspect any tax provision which departs from that ideal. Instead, the first 
steps in the analysis should be the choice of baseline and a defense of that choice.”). 
2020] HEMEL 223 
 
 
Bart and Lisa. Both earn a wage of $10. Bart consumes 
all of his income in the first period, while Lisa saves all 
of hers to consume in the second period. The rate of 
return on investment is 10%. A tax rate of 40% applies 
to all Haig-Simons income (consumption plus change 
in net worth).8 Bart earns $10 in the first period, pays a 
tax of $4, and consumes $6 in the first period. Lisa 
earns $10 in the first period, pays a tax of $4, and saves 
$6. Her $6 of savings become “capital,” which grows at 
a rate of 10%. In the second period, she earns capital 
income of $0.60 and pays $0.24 in tax on her capital 
income. That leaves Lisa with $6.36 to consume in the 
second period. 
 
Example 2: Same as Example 1, except that the tax rate is now 
40% on labor income and 20% on capital income. 
Assume no behavioral changes. Bart again earns $10 in 
the first period, pays a tax of $4, and consumes $6 in 
the first period. Lisa again earns $10 in the first period, 
pays a tax of $4, and saves $6. In the second period, she 
earns capital income of $0.60 and pays $0.12 in tax on 
her capital income. That leaves her with $6.48 to 
consume in the second period. 
 
By setting a lower tax rate on capital income than labor income in 
Example 2, we have left Lisa, our “capitalist,” better off than in 
Example 1. If we consider the Haig-Simons income tax in Example 1 
to be the baseline, then we have in that sense “favored” Lisa in 
Example 2. It is, however, misleading to say that we are favoring 
capital over labor. Both Bart and Lisa are laborers ab initio. The 
difference is that Bart labors and consumes, while Lisa labors and then 
saves and consumes. Rather than favoring capital over labor, we are—
in Example 2—favoring laborers who are also capitalists over laborers 
 
 
 
 
8 See Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL 
INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938). 
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who are only that. 
 
Now consider a third case—that of a consumption tax: 
 
Example 3: Same as Example 2, except that instead of a 40% 
tax on Haig-Simons income, the 40% tax applies only 
to income less savings, or consumption. Bart again 
earns $10 in the first period and saves nothing. His 
income less savings is $10; he pays a tax of $4; and he 
consumes $6. Lisa again earns $10 in the first period 
and saves $10; her income less savings in the first 
period is therefore $0. Her $10 of savings become 
“capital,” which grows at a rate of 10%. In the second 
period, her income less savings is $11, and she pays 
$4.40 in tax. That leaves Lisa with $6.60 to consume in 
the second period. 
 
If our baseline is a consumption tax (Example 3), then by setting a 
lower but still positive tax rate on capital income in Example 2, we 
have left Lisa, our “capitalist,” worse off than in the baseline scenario. 
In that sense, we have disfavored laborers who are also capitalists 
relative to laborers who are only that. Indeed, if a consumption tax is 
our baseline, then the effective tax rate on capital income that neither 
“favors” nor “disfavors” capital income is zero. Consider, briefly, a 
fourth example: 
 
Example 4: Same as Example 3, except that instead of a 40% 
tax on income less savings, we impose a 40% tax on 
labor income and a 0% tax on capital income. Bart 
again earns $10 in the first period, saves nothing, pays a 
tax of $4, and consumes $6. Lisa again earns $10 in the 
first period and now pays a tax of $4, allowing her to 
save $6. Her $6 of savings (capital) grow at a 10% rate 
and generate no additional tax, allowing her to consume 
$6.60 in the second period. 
 
Unsurprisingly to tax students and scholars, Lisa ends up in the same 
position in Example 3 (with an immediate deduction for savings) and 
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Example 4 (with an exemption for the yield on capital investment).9 
This immediate deduction-yield exemption equivalence is the 
intellectual basis for the traditional-Roth distinction in individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs) and defined contribution plans (e.g., 
401(k)s). Example 3 is analogous to a traditional IRA or 401(k); 
Example 4 is comparable to a Roth IRA or 401(k). A tax system that 
allows an immediate deduction for all capital expenditures is akin to a 
tax system with unlimited traditional IRA or 401(k) contributions; a 
system that taxes all labor income upfront but allows capital 
investments to grow tax-free is like a system with uncapped Roth 
IRAs and 401(k)s. 
 
Whether we should tax Haig-Simons income (Example 1) or 
consumption (Example 3 or, almost equivalently, Example 4) is a 
hotly contested question. Very long literatures in economics and law 
address this question—the debate is too wide-ranging to summarize 
succinctly (or even not-so-succinctly).10 Little progress, though, is 
made by stating that the U.S. tax system, which applies a reduced but 
still positive tax rate to most forms of capital income (Example 2), 
therefore favors capital over labor. That is (close to) true if a Haig-
Simons income tax is the baseline and untrue if a consumption tax is 
the baseline. It is, in any event, only problematic if the former system 
is the normative ideal, which is not obviously the case.11 
 
 
 
 
9 This result is subject to a caveat: When a taxpayer has an opportunity to earn supernormal 
returns but cannot exploit that opportunity because of credit constraints, she will prefer a cash-
flow tax regime (Example 3) over a labor income tax regime (Example 4). For a discussion of 
this point, see Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift to a 
Consumption Tax, 86 GEO. L.J. 539, 544 (1998). 
10 See Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax 
Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1414 n.1 (2006) (noting that “[t]he 
literature is immense,” and collecting sources). The discussion of income and consumption 
taxes in this section is heavily informed by Bankman and Weisbach’s analysis. See id. at 
1422-28.  
11 One might be tempted to think that the government can reduce the labor-leisure distortion 
by taxing capital income and using the resulting revenue to cut the tax rate on labor income. A 
lower labor income tax rate and a commensurately higher capital income tax rate would 
reduce the labor-leisure distortion for those workers (like Bart) with a preference for present-
period consumption, but it would exacerbate the labor-leisure distortion for those workers 
(like Lisa) with a preference for future-period consumption.  
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b. A Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax Regime12  
 
Formally, the United States has an income tax at the federal level: a 
tax on “all income from whatever source derived.”13 Several features 
of the U.S. tax system, however, move the status quo away from a 
Haig-Simons income tax and somewhat closer (but not all the way) to 
a consumption tax. 
 
First, the December 2017 tax law allows businesses to claim an 
immediate deduction for the cost of most property placed into service 
between late 2017 and the beginning of 2023.14 After that, federal tax 
law generally allows taxpayers to deduct capital costs at an accelerated 
rate that is faster than the rate of economic depreciation.15 Capital 
expensing does not apply to “acquired intangibles” (patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, etc.), which must be amortized over a 15-year 
period,16 or to residential and nonresidential real property, which must 
be depreciated over 27.5-year and 39-year periods, respectively.17 
Outside of those exceptions, however, we have—at least 
temporarily—moved to what is essentially consumption tax treatment 
for capital investment at the business level. Note, moreover, that 
although investments in real property are not eligible for capital 
expensing, this is not a reason to feel sorry for the real estate industry. 
Real estate investments are eligible for a raft of other tax preferences 
that reduce the effective tax rate on income from real estate 
investments below zero in many cases. 
 
Second, the United States in many instances allows immediate-
deduction or yield-exemption treatment for capital income at the 
 
 
 
 
12 The hybridity of the U.S. tax system has long been recognized. See, e.g., William D. 
Andrews & David F. Bradford, Savings Incentives in a Hybrid Income Tax, in UNEASY 
COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 269 (Henry I. Aaron et al. 
eds., 1988); Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 
TEX. L. REV. 1145 (1991). 
13 I.R.C. § 61(a) (2019). 
14 I.R.C. § 168(k)(6)(A)(i). 
15 I.R.C. § 168(e)(1), (k)(6)(A)(ii)-(v). 
16 I.R.C. § 197. 
17 I.R.C. § 168(c). 
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individual level. This is most clear in the case of traditional and Roth 
IRAs and 401(k) plans. It is also true for other tax-preferred 
investment vehicles, such as health savings accounts (which function 
like traditional IRAs for taxpayers who withdraw funds for non-
medical expenses after age 65), section 529 college savings accounts 
(which function like Roth IRAs for taxpayers who withdraw funds to 
pay for education expenses), and whole life insurance policies (which 
also function like Roth IRAs for taxpayers who maintain their policies 
until death).18 And it is true for long-term investments in non-
dividend-paying stocks such as Amazon, Alphabet, Berkshire 
Hathaway, and Facebook, because those stocks generate no income tax 
liability year-to-year and taxpayers can claim stepped-up basis at 
death, thus avoiding tax on lifetime gains. It is, moreover, more or less 
true for investments in owner-occupied housing, which have Roth 
IRA-like features: the year-to-year yield on an owner-occupied home 
is the untaxed benefit of not having to pay rent to live somewhere else, 
and gains upon sale will generally be eligible for the exclusion of up to 
$500,000 from capital gains tax.19 
 
Third, federal taxes that fund the Social Security Administration’s Old 
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program apply only 
to wages and self-employment income, and not to (most20) capital 
income. The taxable-earnings maximum for OASDI taxation in 2019 
is $132,900. Below that limit, the tax functions like an 11.68% labor 
income tax.21 In that range, the OASDI tax “favors” capital over labor 
only in the sense that a consumption tax “favors” capital over labor, 
which is to say, only if we posit that a Haig-Simons tax is the 
 
 
 
 
18 See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 12, at 1152-55; Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined 
Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 513-20 (2004). 
19 See I.R.C. § 121. 
20 Self-employment income may represent return on capital in some cases, though with modest 
foresight taxpayers can structure their own businesses to avoid OASDI tax on capital yield. 
21 The tax is 6.2% on the employee and 6.2% on the employer. The employee rate is tax 
inclusive and the employer rate is tax exclusive. Thus, if the employee’s nominal wage is $10, 
the employer will pay $10.62 and the government will receive $1.24. Expressed in tax-
inclusive terms (which is the way that income taxes are typically expressed), the rate is 
$1.24/$10.62 ≈ 11.68%. Adding in Medicare taxes, the rate is $15.3/$10.765 ≈ 14.21%. Note, 
though that Medicare taxes apply to all labor income without a taxable earnings maximum and 
to net investment income for taxpayers with adjusted gross income above $200,000 ($250,000 
for a married couple filing jointly). 
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appropriate baseline. (Whether we should consider OASDI taxes to be 
taxes at all—or mandatory contributions to a government-run pension 
plan—is itself a subject of debate: up to a point, additional taxable 
earnings yield higher benefit levels, making them somewhat more 
investment-like and less tax-like.22)  
 
In other contexts, the United States does indeed tax capital—
sometimes at quite high rates. Interest income—i.e., return on debt 
capital—is taxed at a top statutory rate of 37%,23 plus 3.8% in net 
investment income taxes,24 for a federal total of 40.8%. State taxes can 
add up to 13.3%,25 for a total of 54.1%. Qualified dividends and long-
term capital gains—i.e., returns on equity capital—are taxed at a top 
statutory rate of 20%26 (or 23.8% with the net investment income tax, 
and up to 37.1% when accounting for state taxes). And the estate tax—
40% on estates over $11.4 million27—is akin to a capital tax levied 
once per lifetime.  
 
To be sure, much of U.S. corporate debt is held by foreigners who are 
exempt from U.S. withholding tax on portfolio interest28 or by tax-
favored or tax-exempt investors here in the United States;29 most of 
the return on corporate equity escapes shareholder-level taxation;30 and 
a tiny fraction of 1% of Americans who die each year will trigger 
 
 
 
 
22 See, e.g., Louis Jacobson, Medicare and Social Security: What You Paid Compared to What 
You Get, POLITIFACT (Feb. 1, 2013, 10:28 AM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/article/2013/feb/01/medicare-and-social-security-what-you-paid-what-yo 
[https://perma.cc/G3UU-LGQH]. 
23 I.R.C. § 1(j)(2). 
24 I.R.C. § 1411. 
25 Taxes in California, TAX FOUNDATION, https://taxfoundation.org/state/california (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2019). 
26 I.R.C. 1(h)(D). 
27 I.R.C. § 2001(c); Rev. Proc. 2018-57, at 23. 
28 See I.R.C. § 871(h) (portfolio interest exemption); Alexandra Scaggs, U.S. Corporate Bonds 
See Resurgence in Foreign Buyers, BARRON’S (June 10, 2019), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/u-s-corporate-bonds-see-resurgence-in-foreign-buyers-
51560180655 (noting that foreign investors hold 27% of U.S. corporate debt). 
29 On the ownership of U.S. corporate debt, see Major Holders of the U.S. Corporate Bond 
Market, GLOBAL MACRO MONITOR (June 12, 2018), https://global-macro-
monitor.com/2018/06/12/major-holders-of-the-u-s-corporate-bond-market. 
30 See Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S. 
Corporate Stock, 151 TAX NOTES 923, 930 (May 16, 2016) (estimating that taxable accounts 
held less than a quarter of C corporation equity in 2015), 
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estate tax liabilities.31 Still, U.S. individual income taxpayers reported 
roughly $100 billion in taxable interest income, $250 billion in taxable 
dividends, and more than $630 billion in net capital gains in tax year 
2016 (the most recent year for which such data is available).32 The 
United States does, in other words, tax capital income— not always, 
but certainly sometimes. We do not have a Haig-Simons income tax, 
but we do not have a pure consumption tax either. We favor capital 
relative to a Haig-Simons baseline and we disfavor capital relative to a 
consumption tax baseline. Favoritism claims are baseline games.   
 
c. Substituting Capital for Labor? 
 
Some critics of the U.S. tax system’s alleged “robot-favoritism” make 
a less tautological argument than that the U.S. tax system “favors” 
capital over labor. They claim—in the words of Ryan Abbott and 
Brian Bogenschneider—that in some cases a robot “costs more than a 
human worker before taxes, and only becomes cheaper on an after-tax 
basis.”33 The argument is explicit about its baseline: a world without 
taxes. Abbott and Bogenschneider use the following example to 
illustrate: 
 
[A]ssume a robot has a total capital cost of $100,000 and seven 
years of useful life, while an employee has a total wage cost of 
$100,000 over seven years. If accelerated depreciation for 
capital is available, the firm may be able to claim a large 
portion of the $100,000 depreciation as a tax deduction in year 
one rather than pro-rata over seven years. … By contrast, wage 
 
 
 
 
31 See Howard Gleckman, Only 1,700 Estates Would Owe Estate Tax in 2018 Under the TCJA, 
TAX POLICY CTR.: TAX VOX (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/only-
1700-estates-would-owe-estate-tax-2018-under-tcja (estimating that fewer than 0.1% of all 
deaths in the United States will trigger estate tax liabilities under the December 2017 tax law). 
32 IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME, INDIVIDUAL COMPLETE REPORT (PUBLICATION 1304), Table 1.4 
(2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/16in14ar.xls. 
33 Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 2, at 163. Eduardo Porter makes a similar claim, 
stating that “‘accelerated depreciation’ for capital investments . . . allows [firms] to deduct the 
cost of their robots faster than they could deduct the wage of the payroll of the workers they 
replace.” Porter, supra note 4; see also Green, supra note 3 (“Companies will expense the cost 
of purchasing a robot in year one, but only write off job costs as incurred during the duration 
of employment. Front-loading tax breaks for robots are a huge tax advantage, and it will sway 
companies in that direction.”) 
230 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16.1 
 
 
taxes must be deducted as paid (i.e., 1/7th in each year). In this 
case, a present value benefit will accrue from claiming 
accelerated tax deductions for automated workers relative to 
the pro-rata tax deductions for employee wages, even where 
the $100,000 capital outlay is paid up-front.34 
 
The claim is clear about its assumptions, but problematic in its 
reasoning. To unpack it, let’s assume that the human worker receives 
$100,000 in nominal dollars pro rata over seven years; thus, her wage 
is $14,285.71 per year. The present value of those wage payments, at 
the outset, is less than $100,000 if the interest rate is positive. (If the 
interest rate is zero, then there is no tax benefit to accelerated 
depreciation anyway.) Let’s assume, for arithmetic convenience, an 
interest rate of 10 percent. What rate we choose won’t matter as long 
as we remain consistent. With a 10 percent interest rate, the present 
value of the stream of wage payments is $69,548.82. For our 
comparison to be apples-to-apples, then, we need to imagine a robot 
with an upfront cost of $69,548.82.  
 
The most favorable form of accelerated depreciation is immediate 
deduction (i.e., expensing). This is consistent with consumption 
taxation, which—as illustrated above—imposes no effective tax on 
capital income. Let’s imagine that the firm, under a cash-flow 
consumption tax, has the choice between (a) buying a robot for 
$69,548.82 and (b) hiring a human worker for seven years at 
$14,285.71 per year. Does a consumption tax create an incentive to 
choose the former rather than the latter? 
 
In a word: No. To see why, imagine that the firm hires the human 
worker and deposits $69,548.82 in a capital account that grows at the 
assumed interest rate of 10 percent. Each year, the firm earns interest 
at a 10 percent rate and withdraws $14,258.71 to pay the human 
worker’s wage. Because a consumption tax system is cash flow-based, 
the initial contribution to the capital account is deductible. Subsequent 
withdrawals are included in income but then offset by a deduction for 
wages paid. The firm goes on this way for seven years. The resulting 
 
 
 
 
34 Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 2, at 164-65. 
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cash flows are as follows: 
 
 
 
There is no mathematical magic here. As long as the firm can deduct 
capital expenditures at the outset and can deduct wage expenses along 
the way, it is indifferent between (a) buying a robot for $69,548.82 and 
(b) setting aside $69,548.82 in a capital account to pay wages to a 
human worker of $14,285.71 per year for seven years. There is no tax 
benefit for hiring an “automated worker” over a human one.35  
 
For those who prefer intuition to arithmetic, the key point is as 
follows: If a firm in a cash-flow consumption tax system starts with a 
sum of money and has to choose between a robot and a human worker 
to perform the same task, it will choose whichever one—the robot or 
the human worker—is cheapest in pre-tax net present value terms. 
Taxes do not distort the decision; the firm makes the same choice 
under a cash-flow consumption tax that it would in a tax-free world. If 
the firm chooses the robot, it deducts the cost of the robot at the outset 
 
 
 
 
35 The tax system would encourage the firm to choose the robot over the worker only if 
investments in robots were uniquely tax-advantaged as compared to other capital investments. 
Abbott and Bogenschneider point to no reason why this would be the case. They argue that the 
preference for robots over human workers arises out of the general preference for capital over 
labor. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 2, at 164-68. 
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and then pays tax on robot-generated profits as they flow in. If the firm 
chooses the human worker, it likewise can deduct the net present value 
of the human worker’s wages and then pay tax on the human worker-
generated profits as they arrive. To achieve the latter result, the firm 
can invest and immediately deduct a sum equal to the net present value 
of the human worker’s wages (capital investments being immediately 
deductible) and then withdraw from the investment when wages are 
due. The tax on withdrawals and the deduction for wages offset. All 
that is left in both cases is the initial deduction (equal to the cost of the 
robot or the net present value of the worker’s wages) and the tax on 
robot- or human worker-generated profits.36  
 
To recap: We imagined a firm starting out with a sum of money 
($69,548.82, to be precise) and choosing between two options. First, it 
could buy a robot for $69,548.82, which would last for seven years. 
Second, it could hire a worker and pay her $100,000 over seven years, 
which (at our assumed 10% interest rate) reduces to a net present value 
of $69,548.82. Abbott and Bogenschneider assume that the first option 
is tax-favored relative to the second in a regime with capital expensing 
because the firm can deduct the full cost of the robot in the first year 
but deducts wages only as they are paid. This turns out to be wrong, 
though. If capital investments can be deducted immediately, then the 
firm can write off the full $69,548.82 in year one either way. Either it 
will invest in the robot or it will use the $69,548.82 to make another 
 
 
 
 
36 One factor omitted from the analysis above, though sometimes cited as a reason why the tax 
code favors robots, is the fact that employers must pay OASDI taxes with respect to human 
workers but not robots. See, e.g., Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 2, at 163-64; Tom 
Davenport, Advancing the Debate on Taxing Robots, FORBES.COM (June 13, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomdavenport/2019/06/13/advancing-the-debate-on-taxing-
robots/#5dddf45b25a4 (stating that “[i]f robots and humans cost the same amount, tax policies 
make robots cheaper to employ,” and noting that robots “pay no payroll tax”); Porter, supra 
note 4 (“For every worker replaced by a robot, the employer saves on payroll taxes.”). 
However, the “standard view” among economists is that “the economic burden of the payroll 
tax in the United States” is “borne entirely by employees.” Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. 
Metcalf, Tax Incidence, 4 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1787, 1789 (A.J. Auerbach & M. 
Feldstein eds., 2002). The claim that payroll taxes encourage employers to replace workers 
with robots implies that employers bear a share of the payroll tax. That is not an impossibility, 
see, e.g., Paul Bingley & Gauthier Lanot, The Incidence of Income Tax on Wages and Labour 
Supply, 83 J. PUB. ECON. 173 (2002), but—at the very least—commentators who argue that the 
payroll tax pushes employers toward automation bear the justificatory burden of explaining 
why the standard view of payroll tax incidence is wrong. 
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capital investment from which it will withdraw to pay wages in 
subsequent years.37 The firm will have an incentive to choose the robot 
over the worker only if the robot is—in net present value terms—
cheaper than the worker. 
 
III. Robots as Capital and Labor 
 
There is still another reason to doubt the neat syllogism set forth at the 
outset. The claim that robots represent “capital”—more often asserted 
than explained—turns out to be less obvious than it might appear 
initially. The cost of a robot is also—and is perhaps principally—the 
cost of the engineers and other highly skilled workers who design and 
produce the robot. In this respect, automation does not represent the 
displacement of labor by capital, but the displacement of some 
workers by others. 
 
To illustrate: Imagine a bar—let’s call it Moe’s Tavern—that swaps its 
human bartenders for robots. We might say that Moe’s has substituted 
capital for human labor, but that characterization would mislead as 
much as it informs. The metals and plastic that constitute the robot 
bartenders are unlikely to be the major cost drivers here. The bulk of 
the robots’ value derives from the underlying intellectual property—IP 
that was developed, somewhere, by human engineers and other 
knowledge workers. Moe’s Tavern is, in effect, firing its human 
bartenders and replacing them with another fleet of human bartenders 
(who may be hundreds or thousands of miles away in an office 
 
 
 
 
37 If the firm doesn’t have $69,548.82 on hand but needs to borrow, then the outcome is the 
same. A cash-flow consumption tax includes loan proceeds in the base and allows a deduction 
for payments of interest and principal. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-14-16, 
BACKGROUND ON CASH-FLOW AND CONSUMPTION-BASED APPROACHES TO TAXATION 38 (Mar. 
18, 2016). If the firm borrows $69,548.82 to buy the robot, then it includes that amount as loan 
proceeds and deducts that amount as a capital investment. Assume a seven-year amortization 
schedule and a 10% interest rate. The firm then repays (and deducts) $14,285.71 each year for 
seven years. It claims the exact same deduction each year if it pays a human worker 
$14,285.71 each year for seven years (for a nominal total—rounded—of $100,000). If loan 
proceeds are not included in the base and interest payments are not deducted, the outcome is 
equivalent: The firm that buys the robot can claim a deduction of $69,548.82 at the outset, 
which is the same in net present value terms as deducting $14,285.71 in wages paid to the 
human worker each year for seven years. If interest payments are deductible to the debtor and 
taxable to the creditor, then we can ignore the tax treatment of interest payments, and the 
conclusion of the previous sentence applies here as well. 
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building in Silicon Valley or along Massachusetts’s Route 128 
corridor). 
 
This shift in labor is potentially disconcerting for a number of reasons. 
It may mean that a small number of highly educated and highly skilled 
engineers—concentrated largely on the coasts—capture a larger share 
of labor income, exacerbating socioeconomic and geographic 
inequalities. And while automation may create new jobs and entirely 
new industries, it almost certainly will lead to job losses for some 
workers in some regions and demographic groups, who may not be 
able to retrain easily if at all.  
 
But it is more difficult to see either why the U.S. tax system is the 
cause of this shift or why a reduction in tax revenue would be a 
consequence. As for causes: Even if the vestiges of capital taxation 
were excised from the code and we were left with a pure consumption 
tax, there would be no incentive for Moe’s Tavern to replace its human 
bartenders with robots unless the human bartenders were less 
productive or cost more in pre-tax terms. As for consequences: The 
reality is that greater wage inequality will likely lead to more federal 
revenue, not less. That is because marginal tax rates on labor income 
are generally progressive, and so when income shifts from low-
marginal-rate taxpayers to high-marginal-rate taxpayers, revenue 
generally rises. 
 
Even if we treat OASDI taxes as taxes rather than pension 
contributions, marginal tax rates on labor income are generally upward 
sloping over income. The marginal tax rate on labor income for a 
childless taxpayer starts out at around 6.66% (i.e., a 14.21% tax rate 
for Social Security and Medicare, and a negative 7.65% tax rate under 
the earned income tax credit) and tops out at 40.22%. For a taxpayer 
with two children, the marginal rate starts out around -25.79% (i.e., 
14.21% for Social Security and Medicare, and a negative 40% tax rate 
under the earned income tax credit) and plateaus at 40.22% on the far 
right side. There are, to be sure, a few points along the income 
spectrum where marginal tax rates on labor income for taxpayers with 
children potentially exceed 40.22% because of the combination of the 
EITC phaseout, Social Security and Medicare taxes, and the 10% or 
2020] HEMEL 235 
 
 
12% statutory rate. Aggregate data confirms, however, that overall, 
taxpayers with higher incomes generally pay higher marginal tax 
rates.38 
 
An important exception to the general trend of rising marginal tax 
rates on labor income applies to entrepreneurial labor. The legal 
categories of “ordinary income” and “capital gain” imperfectly 
approximate the economic concepts of labor and capital income. The 
bulk of the economic income accruing to Amazon founder and CEO 
Jeff Bezos, for example, is most plausibly characterized as labor 
income: it is the result of his effort and skill (with some luck thrown 
in) rather than a reward for delaying consumption. However, most of 
his income will be taxed—if ever—at the preferential rates that apply 
to long-term capital gains. That is because Amazon issued shares of 
stock to Bezos when the stock was virtually worthless; those shares are 
now worth more than $100 billion; and the shares are capital assets in 
the hands of Bezos that he has held for more than one year.39 Amazon 
itself is subject to a 21% income tax at the corporate level—a tax that 
it impressively avoids.40 But Bezos should be able to avoid any 
additional individual-level tax himself by delaying the sale of stock 
until his death, at which point his heirs’ basis in the stock will be 
“stepped up,” allowing them to sell the shares tax-free. To the extent 
that Bezos needs liquidity to fund consumption during his lifetime, he 
can simply borrow against his Amazon holdings—which will not 
trigger a tax liability—and repay the loan at death. When your net 
worth exceeds $100 billion, finding a financial institution that will 
loan you money cannot be that hard.41  
 
 
 
 
 
38 See MOLLY P. SHERLOCK & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RES. SERV., R45145, OVERVIEW OF 
THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM IN 2018 7 (2019), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45145.  
39 See I.R.C. § 1221 (2019) (definition of capital asset); I.R.C. § 1222 (2019) (long-term 
capital gain treatment for capital assets held more than one year). 
40 See Christopher Ingraham, Amazon Paid No Federal Taxes on $11.2 Billion in Profits Last 
Year, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-
policy/2019/02/16/amazon-paid-no-federal-taxes-billion-profits-last-year 
[https://perma.cc/QTY5-ZDL7]. 
41 Edward McCaffery evocatively refers to this as the “buy/borrow/die” strategy. Edward J. 
McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, 70 TAX L. REV. 305, 317-21 (2017). Though in Bezos’s 
case, it is perhaps better described as “found/borrow/die”  
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Perhaps, then, what commentators who predict automation-induced 
revenue losses are envisioning is that automation will result in the 
replacement of middle- and high-income employees—who may face 
effective tax rates that exceed the 21% corporate rate—with 
entrepreneurial labor, whose income is taxed at corporate level but 
may escape taxation at the individual level. But automation and 
entrepreneurship are not synonyms. As Amy Webb has documented, 
AI research is highly concentrated in nine companies—the so-called 
“G-MAFIA” (Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook, IBM, and 
Apple) and the Chinese firms Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent.42 The 
founders of those companies are taxed favorably on what is essentially 
labor income, but the employees of those companies are not. The 
“remote” human bartenders who replace the humans behind the 
counter at Moe’s Tavern are as likely to be earning salaries that are 
reported on W-2 forms and taxed at ordinary rates as they are to be 
Mark Zuckerberg-types who never take more than a nominal salary 
and whose economic income largely escapes taxation. 
 
Automation may affect tax revenue from labor income in still two 
other ways. First, automated workers may come to perform tasks that 
we now do for ourselves (e.g., cooking and laundry). When robots 
replace humans in household production tasks, revenue may increase 
because equipment purchases from well-established corporations are 
captured in the tax base while household production is not. Second, 
automated workers may come to perform tasks such as waitering and 
bartending that today are largely compensated in the form of tips. 
Because tip income is especially prone to evasion,43 the replacement of 
tip-earning jobs with income-generating robots may have positive 
revenue effects.   
 
One caveat to the discussion above is that automation—by inducing a 
shift in income from lower-earning to higher-earning workers—may 
cause the composition of federal tax revenues to shift away from 
 
 
 
 
42 AMY WEBB, THE BIG NINE: HOW THE TECH TITANS AND THEIR THINKING MACHINES COULD 
WARP HUMANITY 3 (2019). 
43 See, e.g., John E. Anderson & Orn B. Bodvarsson, Tax Evasion on Gratuities, 33 PUB. FIN. 
REV. 466, 466-67 (2005) (compiling estimates of evasion by tip earners). 
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Social Security and Medicare taxes and toward individual income 
taxes. Even if this occurs, though, it is hard to see it as much more than 
an intragovernmental accounting issue: Congress could simply transfer 
dollars from the general fund to the Social Security and Medicare trust 
funds. That might trigger political pushback—but it is not an 
existential crisis for the tax system overall.  
 
IV. Taxing Capital Without Illusion 
 
The discussion above calls into question claims of pro-robot favoritism 
and predictions of automation-induced revenue losses. But what of the 
conclusion that policymakers either should impose an explicit tax on 
automation or should raise taxes on capital more broadly? This final 
part considers whether either policy proposal—an automation tax or a 
shift toward taxing capital more heavily—can be justified on 
alternative grounds. 
 
a. An Automation Tax 
 
Perhaps the best argument for an explicit automation tax goes 
something like the following: Automation has caused and no doubt 
will continue to cause the displacement of some human workers. It 
may generate jobs on net, but those jobs will not necessarily go to the 
same workers who have been displaced. The lessons of the Industrial 
Revolution are instructive. The Luddites—English radicals of the early 
nineteenth century who protested the mechanization of the textile 
industry—look somewhat myopic in retrospect: Surely we would not 
want to return to the era when fabrics were made by handloom. On the 
other hand, the early nineteenth century was a terrible time to be an 
English weaver, and many of the skilled artisans dislocated by the 
power loom did not share in the resulting productivity gains.44 This is 
not a reason to reject technological advances, but it may be a reason—
or so the argument goes—to try to slow the pace of progress. 
 
 
 
 
 
44 See Clive Thompson, When Robots Take All of Our Jobs, Remember the Luddites, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Jan. 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/when-robots-
take-jobs-remember-luddites-180961423.  
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The problems with this argument are several. First, the argument rests 
on the assumption that, absent government intervention, the pace of 
technological change will be too fast. That is a judgment that 
policymakers are ill equipped to make. The advent of Netflix and other 
video streaming services led to the loss of tens of thousands of jobs in 
the video rental industry,45 but few of us wish that the days of 48-hour 
Blockbuster loans had lasted longer. Second, the challenges of 
designing a sensible automation tax are daunting.46 Abbott and 
Bogenschneider suggest an additional federal tax on employers that 
lay off workers “to the extent that the Treasury Department determined 
the layoffs were due to automation.”47 Unfortunately, layoffs rarely 
announce themselves as “automation-induced.” Even if the source of 
each layoff could be ascertained, the potential unintended 
consequences of Abbott and Bogenschneider’s proposal should raise 
alarm. If Moe’s Tavern replaces one of its bartenders with a robotic 
martini maker while brand-new Bart’s Taproom employs a fleet of 
robots and so never needs to hire—or lay off—anyone, is the logical 
policy response to tax Moe’s and not Bart’s? The tax would seem as 
likely to accelerate the decline of incumbent, human-reliant 
establishments as it would be to slow the pace of automation-induced 
job losses. 
 
This is not to suggest that we should be indifferent to the plight of 
workers displaced by automation. A just society should provide its 
citizens with at least a basic safety net—an obligation that applies 
regardless of whether those citizens have lost their jobs due to 
automation or are out of work for other reasons. Elsewhere, Miranda 
Perry Fleischer and I have argued that this safety net should take the 
form of a universal basic income, paid periodically in cash to all 
citizens and lawful permanent residents with no other conditions for 
 
 
 
 
45 See Samuel Stebbins & Evan Comen, America’s 24 Dying Industries Include Sound Studios, 
Textiles, Newspapers, USA TODAY (Dec. 28, 2017, 3:13 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/economy/2017/12/28/americas-25-dying-industries-
include-sound-studios-textiles-newspapers/982514001 [https://perma.cc/8UYE-L5YA]. 
46 Readers are directed to Orly Mazur’s comprehensive and thoughtful critique of a robot tax. 
See Mazur, supra note 1, at 298-303. Mazur agrees with robot tax proponents that the current 
code encourages automation but parts ways on policy, arguing instead for (among other steps) 
the more robust taxation of capital income. Id. at 313-22. 
47 Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 2, at 170. 
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receipt or restrictions on use.48 I will not rehearse the argument here, 
except to emphasize that none of it depends upon automation per se. It 
is, for example, hard to see why a worker who has lost a job in the 
formal wear and costume rental industry—an industry that has 
declined for reasons having little to do with automation—is any less 
deserving of social support than a laid-off port or harbor worker whose 
job loss is more directly attributable to automation and technological 
change.49 
 
b. Taxing Capital 
 
A potentially more compelling proposal than an automation tax is a 
broader increase in the taxation of capital. Others have analyzed the 
case for capital taxation more comprehensively than the space here 
allows.50 Rather than recapitulating those arguments, this final section 
offers several observations regarding promising avenues and dead ends 
for capital taxation proponents.  
 
First, the case for capital taxation must be based on something more 
than a general concern about inequality. A general concern about 
inequality (which this author certainly shares) does not tell us which 
inequalities the tax system ought to target. In Examples 1 through 4 
above, Bart and Lisa have equal income-generating capacities, but 
Lisa saves more and therefore has more capital income than Bart. They 
thus are equal in one respect but not in another. Perhaps Lisa ought to 
pay more in taxes than Bart, but a concern with inequality on its own 
does not tell us why. 
 
Some proponents of capital taxation point to the fact that Lisa, by 
holding her wealth for longer, exerts “economic power” over other 
 
 
 
 
48 Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, The Architecture of a Basic Income, 87 U. CHI. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3346467. 
49 See Stebbins & Comen, supra note 45 (explaining that 46.9% decline in employment in the 
formal wear and costume rental industry in the 2007-2016 period is attributable to, among 
other factors, the decline in marriage rates, while the 58% decline in employment in port and 
harbor operations in the same period is more directly linked to automation). 
50 See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC FINANCE 221-48 (2011); 
Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 10; Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie Stantcheva, A Simpler 
Theory of Optimal Capital Taxation, 162 J. PUB. ECON. 120 (2018). 
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members of society that Bart does not.51 As Ari Glogower eloquently 
puts the point: “If a taxpayer holds wealth for a greater number of 
periods, this wealth generates social and political harms for a greater 
number of periods as well.”52 The claim strikes me as plausibly but not 
obviously correct. Imagine two individuals, Splurge and Scrooge, who 
earn similarly vast amounts through their highly compensated labor. 
Splurge spends her billions of dollars over her own lifetime on private 
jets, lavish events, and self-aggrandizing political campaigns. Scrooge 
is a spendthrift who divides his fortune among his children and 
grandchildren. Is it so clear that Scrooge generates greater social and 
political harms than Splurge? Both should be taxed at high rates, either 
on their labor income or their consumption (and as illustrated in 
Examples 3 and 4, taxes on labor income and consumption are 
equivalent under certain conditions). What is less pellucid is why 
Scrooge should pay an additional sum simply because he saves and 
therefore earns capital income. Note, moreover, that a higher tax on 
capital incentivizes Scrooge to behave more like Splurge. If 
consumption inequality is our concern, then capital taxation is 
potentially counterproductive. 
 
Second, a robust case for capital taxation must explain both the 
deficiencies of relying exclusively on labor income taxation and the 
deficiencies of relying exclusively on a cash-flow (income minus 
savings) taxation.53 The case against labor income taxation is relatively 
straightforward. A labor income tax is vulnerable to income shifting 
across bases.54 Under a labor income tax, for example, entrepreneurs 
will have an incentive to take small salaries from their startups and 
portray their increase in wealth as capital gains on founders’ stock.55 A 
labor income tax also fails to capture gains generated by skillful 
 
 
 
 
51 See, e.g., Ari Glogower, Taxing Inequality, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1421, 1441-42, 1445-49 
(2018). 
52 Id. at 1456. 
53 The landmark article making the case for a cash-flow consumption tax is William D. 
Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 
(1974).  
54 Saez & Stantcheva, supra note 50, at 126. 
55 See Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 60, 70-74 (2011). 
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investing.56 And a tax only on labor income cannot correct for past 
undertaxation of labor income: if an individual has earned wages in the 
past that were taxed at lower than the optimal rate, a tax on future 
wages clearly cannot correct for the past error. 
 
None of these strikes against a labor income tax apply to a cash-flow 
consumption tax (i.e., a tax on personal income minus savings). Under 
a cash-flow consumption tax, the characterization of income as wages 
or as capital gains matters not at all: individuals are taxed on income 
minus savings, so the only way to avoid tax (other than to hide 
income) is to overstate savings. The burden would be on the taxpayer 
to substantiate savings (e.g., to disclose investment accounts and 
produce receipts). Under a cash-flow consumption tax, moreover, 
gains generated by skillful investing are fully included in the tax base 
so long as these gains are ultimately consumed.57 Finally, a cash-flow 
consumption tax can correct for past errors in the taxation of labor 
income. If, for example, we decide as a society that Michael Jordan 
ought to have paid tax at a higher rate on his wages when they were 
earned, we can address that under a cash-flow consumption tax by 
taxing him on his wages when they are consumed. A cash-flow 
consumption tax is, in this sense, the functional near-equivalent of 
traveling back in time and taxing already-earned wages at the 
appropriate rate. 
  
None of this is to suggest that the case for capital taxation is dead on 
arrival. Other arguments potentially support the taxation of capital 
income even as against the alternative of a cash-flow consumption tax. 
One is that capital income taxation serves to redistribute from people 
with rich and generous parents to people whose parents lack the same 
resources or taste for bequests.58 Being born to rich and generous 
parents is, in this view, a source of luck (and ability to pay) much the 
same as being born with high skills. An annual tax on capital income is 
 
 
 
 
56 On heterogeneous returns as an argument for capital income taxation, see Saez & 
Stantcheva, supra note 50, at 127. 
57 See Bankman & Fried, supra note 9, at 544.   
58 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, A Theory of Optimal Capital Taxation 2 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17989, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17989.  
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not the only way to accomplish this objective—a tax on wealth 
transfers (i.e., gifts and bequests) would too—but annual taxes on 
capital income may carry administrative and political advantages over 
taxes levied at death.59 Another argument for taxing capital is that 
capital may be a labor substitute and leisure complement. Taxing 
capital income (or, alternatively, wealth) thus may be consistent with 
the general prescription to tax labor substitutes and leisure 
complements.60  
 
Even if one ultimately concludes that the case for capital taxation is 
unpersuasive when cash-flow consumption taxation is on the table, 
however, this conclusion does not mean that one should favor lower 
capital income tax rates when cash-flow consumption taxation is off 
the table. Concerns about income shifting, supernormal returns, and 
correction of past errors all are compelling reasons to oppose cuts to 
taxes on capital gains (and other forms of capital income) within the 
present framework. If the choice is between a higher or lower capital 
gains tax rate (holding the rest of the tax code constant), then a 
proponent of cash-flow consumption taxation can—without any 
inconsistency—support a higher capital gains tax rate while also 
believing that the optimal tax system would be a cash-flow 
consumption tax that obviates the need to distinguish between ordinary 
income and capital gains. Put differently, the theoretical case for cash-
flow consumption taxation does not compel one to ignore political 
realities that may restrict the menu of live policy options. 
 
The discussion here of capital taxation is concededly cursory, but it 
hopefully goes to shed light on some of the complexities of the subject 
and the costs of robot-based arguments. Those who care deeply about 
redistribution should also care deeply about redistributing effectively, 
 
 
 
 
59 The claim that society should tax bequests from rich and generous parents (either at the time 
of transfer or subsequently through a capital income tax) is not without its critics. The optimal 
tax literature yields conflicting results as to whether bequests should be taxed (because they 
reflect a source of inequality across individuals) or subsidized (because they reflect a positive 
externality from donor to donee). See Helmuth Cramer & Pierre Pestieau, Wealth Transfer 
Taxation: A Survey of the Theoretical Literature, in 2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
GIVING, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY 1107 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier 
eds., 2006). 
60 For further discussion, see KAPLOW, supra 50, at 225-26. 
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because the more effectively we can redistribute, the more 
redistribution we can accomplish. A central element in the design of a 
redistributive tax regime is the choice between a tax that includes 
capital income in the base and a cash-flow consumption tax. The 
argument that we should tax capital to correct the current code’s pro-
robot bias turns out to be a distraction from an important debate. 
Clearing away misperceptions about the effects of taxation on 
automation should allow us to focus our attention on the difficult 
tradeoffs that capital taxation entails. 
 
